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Just Adaptation? How the Diffusion of Norms in the Global
Climate Regime Affects International Climate Politics
by Delf Rothe, M.A.
bstract: Politics in the international
climate regime is a balancing act be-
tween intra- and intergenerational
justice, as it has to account for both the needs
of developing countries and those of future gen-
erations. Following a constructivist approach,
this paper argues that international climate
politics are heavily dependent upon the way cli-
mate change and the appropriate behavior re-
quired to prevent it are constructed collectively.
The article shows how the diﬀusion of norms
and changing images of climate change have
shifted the interests of the actors under the UN
Framework Convention on Climate Change.
As a result, adaptation became more and more
widely accepted as a necessary step in interna-
tional climate politics in advancing the stra-
tegy of climate change avoidance. This also
represents a shift from a focus on intergen-
erational justice as the main normative goal of
the convention, to a broader aim of sustainable
development that comprises both inter- and
intragenerational justice.
Introduction
For mankind, adaptation to changing cli-
matic conditions is nothing new. At any
given point in history, people have been
forced to adapt to changing climatic condi-
tions. In the face of anthropogenic climate
change however, adaptation takes on a new
ethical as well as political significance. As
scientific modeling has developed which al-
lows the prediction of future climatic de-
velopments, adaptation can be undertaken
anticipatorily – and hence alongside mitiga-
tion may be a complementary strategy to
promote intergenerational justice in the face
of climate change. Yet, because most of the
regions suﬀering from the impacts of global
warming lie in developing countries, but it is
the industrialized states that bear the main
responsibility for the origins of these
changes, adaptation is also an issue of inter-
national politics and international justice.
Thus adaptation is seen today as “a necessary
strategy at all scales to complement climate
change mitigation eﬀorts.”1
This development is mirrored in the politi-
cal development of the UN Framework
Convention onClimate Change (UNFCCC).
Until 2001 adaptation did not play any sig-
nificant role in the convention. It was rather
seen as a hindrance of climate policy and
stood contrary to the sustainability norms
that were constitutive of the regime. The
preservation of natural systems for future ge-
nerations was the main goal of the conven-
tion as it was formulated at the UN
Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment (UNCED). On the contrary, the pro-
motion of adaptation measures was seen as a
form of resignation and a turn away from a
policy of preserving the present state of the
ecosystems. Yet from 2001 on, beginning
with the seventh Conference of the Parties
(COP) in Marrakesh, adaptation played a
major part at every annual UN climate sum-
mit.
From a conventional or rationalist perspec-
tive in International Relations this develop-
ment of the climate regime is puzzling. If we
were to assume the purely utility-max-
imizing behavior of states as the main actors
in international climate politics, we would
not be able to explain why they should
voluntarily engage in adaptation projects
that do not in large part benefit them. Yet
by taking a social constructivist perspective,
we can show that the growing role of adap-
tation was the result of a learning process in
the climate regime that shifted the collective
perceptions and norms in the climate
change discourse. Thus, a narrative of cli-
mate change focused on the physical and
ecological that was dominant at the time of
the creation of the regime, was gradually re-
placed by a narrative that stressed the region-
ally specific social implications of climate
change. On an ethical level this represents
the shift from intergenerational justice to
international justice as the main normative
paradigm in international climate politics.
The challenge of constructivism in inter-
national relations theory
Constructivist approaches in the field of
International Relations (IR) developed as a
critique of the dominant theories in IR –
Realism and Liberalism.2 Although there are
many diﬀerent versions of constructivism,
all share the same basic idea: the social con-
struction of reality. While the existence of an
objective reality is not put into question, it
is assumed that humans are not able to per-
ceive that reality directly. Rather, objects in
the ‘real world’ gain their meaning through
the process of human interaction and com-
munication.Thus, the interests of political
actors cannot be regarded as fixed and given,
but depend on the actors self-image, the col-
lectively shared views of the problem or issue
at stake (causal ideas) and conceptions of ap-
propriate behavior (behavioral norms).3 Ac-
tors therefore are seen as homini sociologici
rather than as homo oeconomici. In certain
situations they do not act in a way that max-
imizes their personal gains, but rather in the
way they think is appropriate for the respec-
tive situation.4
Applied to international climate politics this
means that neither do the material charac-
teristics of global climate change determine
politics in the climate regime, nor do the in-
terests of the actors in the regime exist inde-
pendently of the ideas and norms of the
dominant climate discourses. Rather, it is a
particular construction – or narrative – of
climate change that decides which policies
are chosen. Furthermore, the conduct of ac-
tors in the climate regime depends heavily
on their notions of themselves (e.g. as cli-
mate political pioneers or as a victim of cli-
mate change). Norms in climate politics, as
derived from ethical principles like inter-
and intragenerational justice do not simply
exist; they are invented and promoted in
ethical discourses by influential actors like
the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate
Change (IPCC) or the World Commission
on Environment andDevelopment (WCED).
Inter- versus intragenerational justice
In postulating a shift from inter- to intra-
generational justice, this work will first clarify
the meaning of those concepts as well as
their relation to each other.The concept of
intergenerational justice refers to the obliga-
tion of the present generation to enable the
members of successive generations to satisfy
their basic needs in the same way, or in some
better way, than themselves.5 Intergenera-
tional justice in this respect does not only
A
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mean the preservation of natural resources
but refers to all resources (material and ideal)
that may promote human well-being.When
it comes to the political realization of inter-
generational justice, there is one central prob-
lem: the short-term orientation of the
democratic process. Future members of so-
ciety do not have any voice in the system,
and are thus not represented by present de-
cision-makers.
Intragenerational justice on the contrary, re-
fers to the social inequality within national
societies or between diﬀerent states at a global
level (international- or north-south-justice).
While in the case of intergenerational justice
a certain generation is conceptualized as a sin-
gle average individual, in the case of intra-
generational justice the diﬀerences between
the diﬀerent living conditions within a gen-
eration are highlighted. Contrary to inter-
generational justice, conflicting goals in
intragenerational justice can be resolved
through direct negotiations or judicial pro-
ceedings. Moreover, it is possible to directly
increase intragenerational justice through
distributive measures which may also have
positive eﬀects on intergenerational justice,
if the future benefit of the disadvantaged
outweighs the predictable deficit of the ad-
vantaged, i.e. the net-eﬀect in the future is
positive.6
Ethical implications of mitigation and
adaptation
Unmitigated anthropogenic climate change
poses a threat to intergenerational justice di-
rectly and indirectly. Firstly, it threatens to
destroy significant amounts of the earth’s
natural capital (a clean atmosphere, ecosys-
tems, biodiversity etc.). Secondly, there will
be impacts such as extreme weather events
that threaten human-security and well-being
of future generations. Yet, while the direct
eﬀects of climate change will hit future gen-
erations as a whole, impacts on human-se-
curity will remain unequally distributed
between future peoples in the industrialized
world and the developing countries.
When it comes to alternatives to deal with
these problems politically, there are two gen-
eral strategies: mitigation and adaptation.
Whereas the former means an abatement or
prevention of dangerous climate change
through the reduction of CO2-emissions,
the latter refers to the anticipatory and plan-
ned modification of human practices to ac-
commodate climate changes. From a purely
intergenerational point of view, mitigation
can be regarded as the normatively superior
strategy as it guarantees both natural preser-
vation (and is thus compatible with a strict
notion of ecological sustainability) and the
chances of future generations as a whole to
satisfy their basic needs.7 Adaptation policies
on the contrary also have the potential to in-
crease intergenerational justice, when they
have a positive net-eﬀect in the future. Yet
this potential is rather limited, as the eco-
logical losses caused by climate change will
have to be accepted in most cases. Moreover,
as most adaptation has to be undertaken lo-
cally, it will not benefit future generations in
their entireties.
By adopting the perspective of intragenera-
tional justice when analyzing international
politics however, we get a slightly diﬀerent
picture.This position was especially adopt-
ed by developing countries in the 1990s,
leading to a general skepticism among deve-
loping countries regarding climate politics.
At the global level, mitigation policies are
potentially inconsistent with notions of
international justice.This is because indus-
trialized and developing countries have thus
far made unequal contributions to the global
amount of greenhouse-gas emissions. This
led for example to the implementation of
the ‘polluter pays principle’ in the first round
of the Kyoto Protocol, and the search for a
fair allocation mechanism for the next round
(post 2012).8
International adaptation policies, on the
contrary, are normatively rooted in a dis-
course of international justice. As the indus-
trialized states bear the main responsibility
for climate change, but developing countries
will exorbitantly suﬀer from its impacts, a
normative imperative can be derived for the
north to finance necessary adaptation projects
in the south.9 Following this argumentation,
advanced for example by developmental
NGOs, financing adaptation is an appro-
priate measure to guarantee a sustainable de-
velopment of vulnerable countries in the
face of what is, to some extent, unavoidable
climate change.
International climate politics between
mitigation and adaptation
The years following the creation of the
international climate regime at the UNCED
in 1992 were characterized by intense nego-
tiations over an international agreement on
mandatory emission reduction targets (the
Kyoto process). Due to the opposing posi-
tions of European Community (EC) mem-
ber states, climate skeptics like the USA or
Japan, and the developing countries, the ne-
gotiations proved to be very diﬃcult. While
there had been some agreement on an abso-
lute reduction target for industrialized coun-
tries at the 1997 COP-3 meeting in Kyoto,
it was ultimately not until 2000 during the
second part of the COP-6 meeting in Bonn
that the agreement was concluded.10
In the beginning of the Kyoto process the
issue of adaption played a minor role, but
this changed with the seventh COP confer-
ence in Marrakesh, in 2001.11 The Marra-
kesh Accords initialized an international
program to support the developing countries
with adaptation measures. For this purpose,
three funds for the financing of projects in
the south were established. Less developed
countries were engaged through National
Adaptation Strategies (NAPAs) under the
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have at its heart a redistribution of
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Table 1: Important steps in international climate governance
UNFCCC. Alongside the funding of adap-
tion projects the UNFCCC also focused on
the development and distribution of scientif-
ic knowledge, providing the most vulnerable
regions and countries with the means to im-
prove their adaptation eﬀorts. Moreover,
best practice projects should serve as guide-
lines for policy-makers in vulnerable regions
and countries. To this end the UNFCCC
adopted the Buenos AiresWorking Program
on Adaptation and Response Measures in
2004 and the Nairobi Work Programme on
Impacts, Vulnerability and Adaptation to
Climate Change in 2006.12
Cognitive change as social learning
When we look into the reasons for the grow-
ing importance of adaptation, one could
simply point to the fact that scientific cer-
tainty about future climate change has risen.
This could have brought decision-makers to
the insight that they would be better oﬀ if
they look after themselves and thus prevent
work on adaptation. Yet from a social con-
structivist point of view this is clearly only
half of the story, as it does not account for
the political process that led to more exact
scientific insights. The UNFCCC itself is
the necessary condition for this learning pro-
cess through interaction.The invention and
dispersion of new understandings of climate
change was made possible through the stable
framework of international climate negotia-
tions.
Three mechanisms can be identified that
were influential in this development. First,
the annual meetings of the member-states
guaranteed continuous interaction.13 Sec-
ond, the Intergovernmental Panel on Cli-
mate Change (IPCC) was integrated into
the climate regime as a major scientific body.
This enabled a steady exchange between cli-
mate scientists and diplomats.14 Third, the
members of the convention obliged them-
selves to regularly report about their activi-
ties in the field of climate politics (so called
national communications).15 All of this
guaranteed an environment in which new
understandings could evolve (and through
the publications of the IPCC most funda-
mentally) and become collectively accepted
through intensive interaction.
Climate change as a global and ecological
problem
When the climate regime was born in 1992,
there was already an internationally estab-
lished and accepted discourse or narrative
about climate change that could be called a
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global-physical climate narrative. This dis-
course was the result of an ongoing inter-
national scientific interaction at a variety of
conferences held under the auspices of the
UN and the World Meteorological Organi-
zation (WMO). The discourse thus com-
prised the collective ideas about climate
change that had been accepted by the vast
majority of the scientific community at that
time. Through the publication of the first
assessment-report of the IPCC in 1990, this
narrative had already been dispersed in the
political arena of the UNFCCC.
In this dominant discourse climate change
was depicted as a global problem: causes of
climate change were identified with the sum
of total global emissions, and the impacts
were perceived as global in scale (e.g. sea
level rise).16 Furthermore it was clear that the
scientific facts about the exact development
and future impacts of climate change
remained uncertain.17 Nonetheless, the
insight that climate change was the result of
greenhouse-gas emissions can be regarded as
having been collectively accepted in the do-
minant climate discourse.18 Climate change
was generally framed in terms of the natural
sciences, which suppressed other, more
socially orientated, interpretations. In terms
of societal impact this meant that climate
change was primarily perceived as an
environmental problem, and to a lesser ex-
tent a social or economic one.19
Table 2: Elements of a global-physical narra-
tive.
The general conception of climate change
had some serious implications for the col-
lective ideas about adaptation to climate
change. As climate change was primarily re-
garded as a problem for the future environ-
ment, the duty of policymakers was to avert
it. In this context, adaptation was not seen as
a desirable option in climate politics but ra-
ther as capitulation.20 While climate change
was seen as a global problem, the problem
of adaptation was perceived to be a local
one, as the impacts of global warming vary
greatly from place to place. It was considered
doubtful to predict impacts at a local level
so that anticipatory adaptation appeared ir-
rational.21The construction of the accepted
conception of climate change in physical
terms led to the collective belief that adap-
tive capacity is an intrinsic feature of region-
al ecosystems, rather than a function of
socio-economic conditions that could be po-
litically modified. Finally, and following
from this, adaptation was widely interpreted
as being part of the expected costs of global
warming.22
Climate change as a regional and social
problem
From 2001 onwards, there were a number
of considerable changes in the discourse on
climate change in the UNFCCC. Probably
the most important change was the growing
evidence of the occurrence of climate
change.23 Furthermore, the spatial percep-
tion of global warming seems to have
changed.The main reason for this was the
development of new regional climate models
that are far more precise and allow for accu-
rate predictions at a regional level.This led
to the realization that the perception of cli-
mate change as a global problem does not
adequately account for its local impacts.24
Moreover, the focus is no longer on the ef-
fects of global warming upon certain ecosys-
tems but on the vulnerability of certain
regions and communities.This leads us to
another shift in the perception of climate
change: it is not illustrated in purely physi-
cal terms anymore, instead it is portrayed –
at least with respect to its impacts – in its
socio-economic context.25
The changes in the collective perception of
climate change also alter the image of adap-
tation in the context of international climate
politics.The problem of climate change now
appears to be a secure scientific fact. More
exact regional climate models show that the
least developed parts of the world, who have
contributed the least to the greenhouse ef-
fect, will likely suﬀer the most from its ef-
fects. This has also led to the collective
perception of contemporary weather ex-
Intergenerational Justice Review
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tremes as being the first significant visible
consequences of climate change. Through
this development the discourse of climate
politics engages with the discourse of deve-
lopment politics and/or sustainable deve-
lopment. Adaptation and mitigation are no
longer perceived as excluding each other, but
as complementary strands of an interna-
tional climate political strategy.26
The evolution of norms in international
climate politics
When the UNFCCC was initialized three
dominant climate political norms in the
international arena had already been estab-
lished.The first norm resulted from years of
ongoing international scientific cooperation
and from a collective interpretation of cli-
mate change as a global problem. It can be
formulated as follows: the problem of cli-
mate change should be solved by the inter-
national community in a cooperative
manner.27 The two other predominant cli-
mate norms derived from an international
discourse on sustainability initiated by the
Club of Rome in the 1970s, and politically
enforced by the Report of the WCED in
1987.28
The first of these norms translates the impli-
cations of an intergenerational ethics into a
behavioral norm for climate politics, arguing
that eﬀorts to mitigate climate change
should be undertaken in spite of definite
scientific facts (i.e. precautionary princi-
ple).29 As global warming poses a threat for
the well-being of future generations, insuﬃ-
cient scientific certainty must not be allowed
to result in political inactivity.The second
sustainability-norm reflects, in contrast to
the first, a concept of international justice:
because industrialized countries bear the
largest share of responsibility for climate
change, they should take the lead in climate
politics (i.e. the polluter pays principle).30
The WCED can be regarded as the initiator
of these two sustainability norms in the cli-
mate regime, as it as it was the one organi-
zation with the authority and legitimacy
necessary to successfully promote these
norms internationally.With the formulation
of the UNFCCC treaty these three climate
norms were collectively accepted and were
made international law.31
The growing importance of adaptation was
not the result of a displacement of these cli-
mate norms by newly established ones. Ra-
ther, the concrete meaning of the norms
described above changed and was extended
against the background of the changing cli-
mate discourse. In the cognitive context of
1992, the primary normative imperative in
climate politics was to abandon or avert cli-
mate change.32This can logically be derived
as follows. Global warming poses a threat to
the environment and to future generations,
thus, climate change should be averted. In
order to do so, global emissions should be
reduced in absence of absolute certainty, and
that due to their historical debt industrial-
ized countries should take the lead in doing
so. In other words, this logic means that ac-
cording to a global-physical narrative, a
strict concept of ecological sustainability
leads to the normative superiority of mitiga-
tion over adaptation.
However, the more the cognitive context in
climate politics has shifted towards a region-
al-social narrative, the more the normative
judgment of adaptation changed.This can
also be explained logically, as follows. Cli-
mate change poses a threat to existing and
future generations especially in poor coun-
tries. The industrialized countries are re-
sponsible for the main part of climate
change. Therefore, developing countries
should be supported by developed nations
in their eﬀorts at adaptation to climate
change, and adaptation should be under-
taken in an anticipatory fashion. On an ethi-
cal level, this development reveals a
normative shift away from a rather strict
conception of sustainability, to a more so-
cially oriented conception in which interna-
tional justice is advanced, and increasingly
serves as a driving factor in climate politics.
To guarantee sustainable development, it is
no longer seen as suﬃcient to free develop-
ing countries from obligations in the climate
regime. Instead, they must actively be
supported.
Polluters, non-polluters and victims in the
climate regime
Including adaptation as a part of global cli-
mate governance however, is not simply the
result of altruistic behavior on the part of the
industrialized countries within the norma-
tive context described above. Rather, the
process through which these cognitive
changes took place went hand in hand with
the alteration of some of the actors’ identi-
ties, and thus their very interests. Most im-
portant in this respect was the development
of a collective identity among the most vul-
nerable countries. At the beginning of inter-
national climate negotiations, most of the
developing countries saw themselves as not
being truly involved in questions of climate
change. From the point of view of interna-
tional justice, they did not feel responsible
for the fate of future generations. This re-
sulted from the fact that there were two
distinct role models in international climate
politics, the polluters (the industrialized
countries) and the non-polluters (the develop-
ing countries).33 There was only a small
group of small island states (AOSIS) that un-
derstood themselves to be threatened by glo-
bal warming. Through the process of
interaction in the ongoing climate regime
negotiations, this constellation of roles
began to change. First, the changing climate
discourse led to the insight on the part of
many developing countries that their socio-
economic and/or geographic situation made
them particularly vulnerable. Second, deve-
loping nations began to take the communi-
cative signals of the polluters in the climate
negotiations into account. Although the
latter had obliged themselves to prevent cli-
mate change, they either expressed their un-
willingness publicly (as in the case of the
‘climate skeptics’) or they failed to reach
their reduction targets (like some states of
the European Union).34
As a result, the developing countries began
to share a notion of a common fate in facing
the threats of climate change: they did not
see themselves as non-polluters anymore, but
Intergenerational Justice Review
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Table 3: Elements of a regional-social climate discourse.
rather as victims. The changing collective
identity of the developing countries thereby
led to the alteration of their very interests.
From their self-image as victims, they drew
power for arguments in favor of compensa-
tion and support in the process of adapta-
tion. Their collective identity serves as a
fastener, allowing them to develop a com-
mon position in the negotiations and there-
by add authority to their accounts.Thus, the
growing presence of adaptation issues in the
UNFCCC can be explained by more ex-
plicit claims for compensation by develop-
ing countries.35
Thus, under a global-physical climate dis-
course the perspective of intergenerational jus-
tice was normatively forwarded in the
international climate regime by some of the
industrialized countries (the EC member-
states). In that context, the developing coun-
tries had no incentive to participate in
international climate politics and relied on ar-
guments of international justice to justify this.
Yet, from the same standpoint, under a re-
gional-social climate discourse, they actively
developed claims in international climate gov-
ernance. Whereas under a global-physical
discourse the suﬀerers (future generations)
were anonymous and had no direct voice in
the negotiation process, the suﬀerers under
a regional-social perspective are actively en-
gaged in the negotiations.
Conclusion
This article has shown that the growing im-
portance of adaptation as an international
climate political strategy can be explained by
a learning process which has taken place with-
in the climate regulation regime. Scientific
and political interaction led to the shift from
a global-physical to a regional-social narra-
tive on climate change.We have further seen
that the political implications of ethical
principles such as inter- and intrageneration-
al justice depend heavily on the discursive
context of the political issue-area. Under a
global-physical narrative, the intergeneration-
al implications of climate justice were for-
warded within the climate regime, while
international justice was mainly invoked by
developing countries to contest their own
participation in a global mitigation scheme.
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A regional-social discourse however, has led
to a more prominent and active role for
international justice arguments in climate
politics, allowing them to become a driving
factor in the push for a combined political
strategy of mitigation and adaptation. A so-
cial constructivist analysis of this transition
shows that the interests of actors in the cli-
mate regime are not independent of their
surrounding beliefs and the context that in-
fluences their very identities.The self-image
of developing countries changed as they
began to realize that they will have to bear
most of the negative consequences of cli-
mate change. And unlike future generations,
developing countries have a voice in con-
temporary climate negotiations. This may
open a window of opportunity in upcoming
negotiations to integrate such countries into
global mitigation schemes.
The UN climate summit (COP-15) in Co-
penhagen this December is going to be a
critical moment in developing such a plan.
There, an agreement on the institutional de-
sign of a second commitment period to the
Kyoto Protocol shall be reached. With re-
spect to intergenerational justice, it will be
decisive to reach a binding agreement on
global emission reductions that sticks to a
maximum limited average temperature rise
of 2°C, and will be accepted by the highest
possible number of high-emission states.
To reach this goal however, the emerging
countries and some of the larger developing
countries must participate.The broadened
agenda of international climate governance,
with adaptation and technology transfer as
part of a climate strategy sensitive to inter-
national justice, can help to manage this
challenge. It raises the possibility of package
deals that compensate participating develop-
ing and emerging countries with technology
partnerships, fund adaptation and oﬀer
knowledge transfers, all of which together
could enable disadvantaged countries to de-
velop their economies in a sustainable man-
ner.
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